

AN COSANTOIR

(A Military Review)

Published
under the
auspices
of the
Southern
Command

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Editorial Offices:

Headquarters, Southern Command, Cork.

Publishing and Managerial Offices:

Paramount Printing House, Clarke's Bridge, Cork

Vol. 1. No. 1.

Price Twopence

December 27th, 1940.

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An COSANTÓIR

Vol. 1.

DECEMBER 27th, 1940.

No. 1.

LOYALTY

By MAJOR GENERAL D. McKENNA, Chief of Staff.

THE present expansion of the Army has brought into its ranks men of every political party and men of every creed and class. This unification of the different elements of the community is in itself one of the greatest factors in our defensive strength to-day.

The magnificent response to the appeal for recruits for the Army, and the even more splendid rallying of our manhood to the ranks of the Local Security Force, bear witness to the loyalty of her sons to Ireland's cause.

By this common loyalty to our country we are united in a great bond of comradeship. No personal feelings or prejudices must be permitted to mar this unity. Our loyalty must be given without condition and without reserve.

We must seize every opportunity to show that we are good comrades, that we are worthy members of the organisation to which we belong, and that Ireland's cause is greater than any personal motive or private jealousy.

We must learn to know and appreciate the good which is in each of our comrades. Each must contribute his share to the fostering of good comradeship as the cement of common loyalty. Thus, whether we are in the Army or in the Local Security Force, we shall create a spirit of soldierly unity that will in later times be a proud and pleasant memory.

It is in this manner only that patriotism effectively functions and loyalty is practically expressed.

The matter contained in "An Cosantóir" is supplied from Headquarters of the Southern Command. The views expressed are those of the individual contributors unless the contrary is clearly stated.

Contributions are invited from members of the Army and the L.S.F.

Manuscripts must be legibly written on one side only of the paper and must bear the name and address of the sender. Typewritten articles are preferred.

The most suitable subjects are—

- (a) Current local defence problems and exercises.
- (b) Instructional Articles on Training.
- (c) Military History.

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Manuscript intended for publication must be submitted for censorship.

Communications for the Editor should be addressed to The Editor, Headquarters, Southern Command.

Communications respecting advertisements and supplies of "An Cosantóir" should be sent to the Advertising Manager, "An Cosantóir," Paramount Printing House, Clarke's Bridge, Cork.

THE L.S.F.

ITS FUNCTIONS AND IMPORTANCE

Importance as Defence Force.

The L.S.F. is of the very greatest importance as a defence force by reason of the following factors.

1.—Its numerical strength is great and can be made greater still. It enables every able-bodied man to play his part in the defence of his home and country, even though he continues his civil occupation up to the time of invasion. Through a well-trained and disciplined L.S.F. we can deploy against an invader our maximum strength—a strength many times greater than that of our regular forces.

2.—We have, or can have, in the L.S.F. the best brains, skill and experience in the country. We can have an array of talent devoted to the solution

by
COLONEL M. J. COSTELLO,
O.C., Southern Command

of our defence problem which it would be impossible for us to have in the army without bringing the whole industrial, commercial and administrative life of the country to a stand still.

3.—Since the L.S.F. is everywhere, it is always on the spot. No matter what the point of attack, there is no question of our being defenceless in the locality or of the enemy having a walk over. If we had to disperse our regular troops to cover all the danger points, we should have little left as a striking force. Because the L.S.F. is capable of looking after local defence tasks the strength of our striking forces has been multiplied many times. Practically our whole army can be used as a highly mobile striking force. It can be concentrated for training and it can be manoeuvred and deployed with great security and freedom.

4.—Because of its detailed local knowledge the L.S.F. is of tremendous value. Through this know-

ledge we can exploit fully the advantage which detailed knowledge of the ground gives in a fight. Time spent in reconnaissance is reduced to a minimum. Administrative problems, such as billeting and supply, can be handled speedily with the advantage of a full knowledge of local resources.

Indirect Importance

1.—The L.S.F. is also of the first importance as a means of welding together in its defence all the elements which go to make the Irish Nation. It is the best manifestation of the unity of the nation in the face of the common danger. It can develop and consolidate that unity for which all our national leaders have called and it is obvious to all how great a factor in our defensive strength this unity is. Constant effort is needed to make us sink our petty differences and to realise the essential things which we have in common; to substitute the name of Irishman for every sectional title. In the matter of Ireland versus the foreigner we are all for Ireland and by keeping constantly before its members and the public this fundamental fact, the L.S.F. can smooth out and overcome whatever obstacles may arise to full national unity on the defence issue.

2.—In modern war the strength of a nation depends in the first instance upon the strength of the national will, upon the determination of its people to resist aggression. The strength of an army lies more in its moral qualities than in anything else and the moral qualities of an army—its patriotism, its discipline, its fighting spirit—will depend to a great extent upon the spirit of the people. The L.S.F. can be a great factor in strengthening and sustaining the national will to resistance.

3.—Discipline has not been one of our strong points as a people but we must develop it if we are to survive the world of to-day. By their example the members of the L.S.F. can do more to develop

national discipline than would be possible by any other means.

4.—Lastly, the L.S.F. provides an outlet for the energies of the youth of the nation. Apart altogether from the immediate advantages of harnessing to our defence problem the virility, keenness and enthusiasm of youth, the nation stands to benefit greatly from the development in the minds of the coming generation of true patriotism and habits of discipline, order and punctuality.

Organisation.

A military force requires to be fully organised in order that it may act with cohesion and economy of men and material.

Its members should each be put to do the job for which they are best fitted. In the well organised unit there will be no square pegs in round holes. Skill and knowledge of every kind will be applied to those tasks at which they will be most useful.

Each job of work must be the responsibility of a specified unit or man. Each unit and each officer must know the tasks assigned to it or him and be fully prepared to perform them.

All units must be fitted together like parts of a machine so that the whole organisation will function smoothly without friction or overlapping.

The whole organisation must respond with accuracy and energy to the orders of the Government and of each of the authorities between the Government and the individual member.

Morale and Discipline.

Before setting out the tasks of the L.S.F. it is necessary to say that the mere formal enrolment of members, their organisation into squads, sections and groups, and even their training in military duties, will not make them into a military force. Unless there be developed in the L.S.F. the qualities of morale and discipline it will be unable to perform its tasks in war. These are the qualities which give life to the formal organisation, which turn it into a military unit, which distinguish it from a crowd or mob. The morale of the unit is the state of mind of the unit as a whole. A high morale means the development of the fighting spirit, the spirit which

will endure and dare all in the common cause. It is the spirit which must be common to all members, which welds them all together, which gives to each the strength of all, which sustains the weak and which makes the strong act for his comrades and his unit rather than for himself.

Discipline is a habit. It is the habit of cheerful, intelligent and unhesitating obedience to orders.

A high morale and firm discipline are far more important than anything else in war. They are indispensable. No quantity of arms, no superiority in numbers, no amount of skill will make up for lack of the spirit which gives cohesion and power to the unit or for want of the discipline necessary to ensure that orders are promptly and properly carried out.

In succeeding issues of this paper there will be separate articles on Morale and Discipline.

Tasks of the L.S.F.

(a) We want so to organise the work of defending the country that all engaged upon it pull together, each unit doing the job for which it is best fitted. The factors referred to in para. 1 enable the L.S.F. to do many jobs which the army could not do, or could do only by dispersing its fighting units and thereby weakening its strength as a striking force. These factors are the key to the proper employment of the L.S.F.

(b) The tasks allotted to the L.S.F. are:

- (i) Providing transport, including drivers, for the fighting units of the Army so that they can move with the least possible delay against an invader.
- (ii) Protecting, controlling and directing long motor transport moves of military units, so that troops may be moved with the greatest speed and safety. Maintenance and protection of routes.
- (iii) Providing information for the military about the enemy, the situation of our own troops and the terrain, including, where necessary, the provision of guides, billeting parties, etc.

(Continued on page 22)

DELAYING ACTION

By MAJOR T. FOX.

ONE of the essentials to success in attack is speed. It multiplies the weight and effectiveness of any blow. This has long been recognised by military commanders who have sought constantly, ways and means of accelerating movement. The harnessing of the internal combustion engine to the military machine has, when conditions of terrain and weather have been favourable, revolutionized the conditions of warfare. The lightning advances of the German Armies in Poland and France will be readily recalled.

Without this speed, decisive success cannot be attained except at the cost of many lives, much material, and time, and any slowing down or movement proportionately increases the bill. This is what a commander fighting a delaying action aims to achieve, whilst avoiding engaging his force in a decisive battle in which all the advantages would be with his enemy.

A boxer meeting a heavier and stronger opponent will not stand in one position and allow himself to be battered and pummelled into insensibility. He will use the ring, his eyes, his brain, and his legs to avoid, and his arms to parry the blows of his opponent, whilst he seeks every opportunity to plant shrewd, well-timed counter punches with the object of weakening and slowing down his opponent. Such a boxer must be well trained, and must have a deep knowledge of the tactics of boxing. All his training and skill would avail him nothing to win the contest if he merely allowed himself to be driven around the ring, avoiding his opponents onslaught without attempting to deliver one blow himself. In other words, he must fight to avoid defeat.

Just like the boxer, a force engaged in a delaying action must be in good physical condition, and well trained in delaying tactics. Good physical condition improves mobility and endurance, training assists manoeuvrability. Its brain—the commander—must be alert and active, ready to take advantage of every error committed by the enemy, quick to sense danger and meet it, and should possess the power to inspire to greater effort when it is needed, and to fortitude in adversity. Of all the forms of control delaying actions calls for a higher standard of these qualities in officers and men than in any other.

Circumstances under which delaying actions occur :—

Delaying actions are fought—

- By an inferior force to oppose the advance of an enemy superior in numbers and material with the object of inflicting the greatest possible damage and loss of time at the least expense.
- When the terrain does not offer facilities for defence.
- To gain time.
- By rearguards, flank guards, advanced guards, forces covering a withdrawal and by cavalry units.

Decision :

Promptitude in making a decision is in all circumstances a virtue, but never more so than in delaying action, where every moment counts. The decision is arrived at by making a careful review of all the pertinent circumstances of the situation and the terrain. It includes :

- The direction in which the action is to be fought, i.e., the direction in which the successive withdrawals will be made.
- The position or positions on which the force will deploy.
- The disposition of the troops on the position or positions.

The decision to fight the action on one position or in successive positions is influenced by :—

- The mission of the force.
- The terrain.
- Time.
- The condition of the enemy force.
- The size of the delaying force.

If, for example, a force is given the mission of covering the withdrawal of another force across a river, the decision to fight in one or more positions will depend on :—

- The relative location of the delaying force and the enemy to each other with reference to the river.

- The time it will take to effect the crossing of the river.
- The nature of the terrain.
- The size of the delaying force.

All these factors are interrelated. A decision cannot be made on any one of them, although one may have an overwhelming bearing on the others. For example in the case stated above, the terrain may be such that only one suitable position can be found to fight on, or the time factor may prohibit the use of more than one position.

Terrain :

Delay is caused by halting the enemy's orderly advance at the earliest possible moment. He can advance most rapidly on roads in formation suitable to rapid movement. This movement may be on vehicles or on foot. The formation suitable for movement on roads is not suitable for fighting. If forced off the roads rate of movement is seriously curtailed.

It takes time to change from one formation to another. The decision to make this change when opposition is encountered follows from information obtained by the leading troops, or from a reconnaissance. This takes time. The passing back of information, and the issue of orders take time. The execution of the movement takes time, which increases in proportion to the number of men being deployed. The initial information may be inadequate, to obtain more takes time. The formation and execution of each successive plan takes time.

How can these conditions be forced on any enemy and advantage taken of them to cause delay? By citing the delaying force and its weapons on ground which will permit of their employment at their maximum range.

High ground gives good observation and good command of the lower ground. If it does not possess cover the occupiers of it can be as easily seen from the low ground, after they have disclosed their location on the opening of fire as they themselves can see. This would make the task of the attacker very easy. He would be presented with information without having to fight for it, and his weapons would be employed to their maximum efficiency. Delay on the position would be slight, withdrawal would be difficult, and losses both in men and material would be high.

In addition to command and cover, delaying positions should have good covered routes for communi-

cation and withdrawal. They should command all the direct routes, of advance of the enemy, and thus compel him to make a frontal attack or a turning movement; one will be costly in men and the other in time. The reader should study the tactics of General Joseph E. Johnson in the battles following Chattanooga in the American Civil War for examples of the correct selection of terrain for delaying action.

Single Position :

Delaying action in a single position approximates closely to the defence of a position. It differs in that there is no intention to hold on to it indefinitely but only for a limited time sufficient to accomplish the mission. Consequently the troops can be disposed on a wider front, reliefs need not be provided, and less depth is required. Particular attention must be given to the security of the flanks. Orders should indicate whether or not counter-attack will be made to retain the position. Usually the intention is to hold out on the position during daylight and to use darkness to cover withdrawal.

Successive Positions :

The use of more than one delaying position enables a commander to continue the action after withdrawal from the first position. From the second position he should be able to assist this withdrawal.

The second and each subsequent position should have the same general characteristics as the first. It should not be so close to the first position that the attacker will not have to make any alterations in his original plan, orders and disposition to attack it. Neither should it be so distant from the first that the artillery on it cannot give support to the troops fighting on the first position or during the withdrawal from it.

It will be necessary on occasions where it is found that two good delaying positions are too far apart to occupy an intermediate covering position to assist the withdrawal from the first.

It will be seen that the equipment of a force has a big influence on the selection of the positions. The possession of artillery permits of the second position being more distant from the first than in the case of one without artillery. For the former the distance can be from 3,000 to 10,000 yards, and for the latter from 1,000 to 2,500 yards.

(To be Continued)

The L.S.F. Rifle

The rifle issued to the L.S.F. is one of the most modern and one of the best rifles, if not the very best rifle in use. It is probably the most accurate military rifle in the world. With a powerful propellant and streamlined bullet the trajectory is flat. Consequently during combat comparatively little adjustment of the sights is necessary.

In this series of articles a detailed description, illustrated by diagrams, will be given of the mechanism and use of the rifle.

First, however, comes the question of care and cleaning. This excellent rifle demands the very best of care. The condition of the rifles on charge to a Group will be an unmistakable indication of the Group's zeal and efficiency.

Importance of Proper Care.

The rifle is a piece of fine mechanism. It must be kept clean, free from rust, and well lubricated if it is to do good work and remain in serviceable condition. The cleaning and care of the rifle is an important duty to be performed by all soldiers armed with this weapon, and a subject which demands the serious attention of all officers. Experience has shown that the majority of rifles become unserviceable, not through shooting but through the lack of intelligent and proper care. The use then of materials other than those authorized for the specific purposes mentioned is strictly forbidden.

Inspections.

At all inspections unless otherwise explicitly ordered, the rifles will be clean, the bore of the rifle protected with a thin film of grease, the mechanism of the rifle lubricated with thin oil, and the oil bottle filled with oil. When the inspector wishes to inspect the rifles minutely he may order that all grease and oil be removed from them; but in such cases the grease and oil will be applied again immediately after the inspection, and the inspector will allot a specific time for so doing.

Care and Cleaning in Garrison.

Care and cleaning in garrison includes the ordinary care of the rifle to preserve its condition and appearance in garrisons, posts, and camps during those periods when no firing is done.

Damp air and sweaty hands are great promoters of rust. The rifle should be cleaned and protected

after every drill. Special precautions are necessary when the rifles have been used on rainy days and after turns of guard duty.

The barrack cleaning rod only will be used. The use of the pull-through and brush will be confined to occasions when the barrack cleaning rod is not available. Rifles will always be cleaned from the breech, the bolt being removed during cleaning for this purpose.

To clean the rifle, rub it with a rag which has been slightly oiled or greased, and then clean with a perfectly dry rag. Swab the bore with an oily flannel patch and then with a perfectly dry one. Dust out all screw heads and crevices with a small, clean brush. Wipe the stock and sling with an oily rag and then with a perfectly dry one.

Immediately after cleaning, to protect the rifle, swab the bore thoroughly with a flannel patch saturated with grease. Wipe over all metal parts, including the bolt mechanism and magazine, with an oily rag. Apply a few drops of light oil to all cams and working surfaces of the mechanism.

After cleaning and protecting the rifle, place it in the gun rack without any covering whatever. The use of canvas or similar covers for the rifle is prohibited as they collect moisture and rust the metal parts. When barracks are being swept, gun racks may be covered with a piece of canvas to protect the rifles from dust.

Care and Cleaning after Firing.

When a rifle has been fired the bore must be thoroughly cleaned not later than the evening of the day on which it is fired. Thereafter it must be wiped out and regreased each day for the next three succeeding days at least.

To clean the bore after firing, insert the muzzle in a vessel containing hot water and soap, hot water alone, or cold water; insert the cleaning rod with a cloth patch assembled in the breech and move forward and back for about one minute, pumping the water in and out of the bore. While the bore is wet a brass or bronze wire brush, if available, should be run all the way through the bore, then all the way back three or four times. Water should again be pumped through the bore. Then wipe the cleaning rod dry, remove barrel from water, and, using dry, clean flannel patches, thoroughly swab the bore until it is perfectly dry and clean, being careful to see that the chamber is also dried and cleaned. Hold the breech of the barrel pointed toward the sky and examine the bore carefully for metal fouling.

If no metal fouling is present, saturate a clean

(Continued on page 27)

SEIRTEANNA COGAID 1914-1940

Dá dháiméire ir atá riar "Cogaí na gCeirne mhuin," tá mór ámhán go háirde a téigeann in a tuise ar dhúine iosta na catanna ar an tair-riont agus ríó é é; go raib an bunáirte go fairsing as an gcorantact ar an ionnruideact nuair oo daingnuisead an line, ré rin le uinn na mhuin 1915, 1916 7 1917. Sa mhuin 1918, oo cuiread an riar pan ar neamh nio agus ar pan amac, bi an rseal ar a toil seall leir as an ionnruideact.

Ni mirt na rriom-airdeanna ba bun leir an atair pan oo tuad. (1) An rseal oo cuiread ar rionairdeact an oirionair oo rieri na learrigale (2) an timirideact oo deim an fupieann rriurpa ar durrar ioncarr (3) an rseal oo cuiread ar camouplage eun rin an tuet ionnruide oo deit (4) an oll-urair oo bainead ar tankanna. Uiao na Sapanais ba tuirge oo bain rior ar an otank. Na doinnir rin an oo bain na Searmainis breir rsealma ar an murcarr-sar, nio oo cuir eio oo bunáirte an tank ar neamh nio.

Taireir an Cogaí, nioir ionann car o'aon ceann oo rna rri rriortac ro;—an Ureataim mior, an ffrainne, an Searmain. Oo deim Sapan a harim oo rcur go rpario go oir go raib ré ré bun a neart rriortana. I gcomparair leir rin nioir deim an ffrainne a harim oo tuigeatú ac beagan agus maiuir le lionhairdeact agus le Seiranna arimta, ni raib aon breir as aon arim eile pan Eorair uirte. Oo rieri Connrad Versailles, ni raib ceo as an nSearmain car 100,000 rpar oo beir pan arim aice agus ror nioir leogas oi fupieann Scirpa Senearla, oirionair rriom, tankanna na eiteallain oo beir aice.

SASANA

Nioir har a deite rriuirin an aigne ré cogaí oo bi as na rri harim. Oo bi ré oo tuairim as na Sapanais, oá mbead cogaí mior eile ann go Ureairairir leanaint leo on bpoirnte in ar rparadair agus go mbead ar tuar ceona as an otank ir oo bi aige i 1918. Ni oad nio go raib muingin ar an tuar; har in oiair ar noiair oo corruigeatair ar miorpucan a deanam ar a harim ar rriuge nuair oo breir an cogaí ro amac, bioair neam-rrieadac leir an gcapall seall leir

agus rós nioir mo na arim ar bir eile pan Eorair. Ac maiuir leir an ionnruideact, ni raib an ffr ceona acu. Cuir rseal pan "Field Service Regulations (1935)" pan ait a baineann leir an ionnruideact, breirair fupab é an deairideact ir mó atá as an ionnruideoir nuair atá an ceo deim de'n out ar aiair oo bi ceairide baint amac aige, na é oo deimao ruar. Oubrad go mbeir an deim rin ioir 1,000 7 2,500 rlat ar oirinear. Tá frior agaimn anoir on gCogaí ra Ufrainne 7 rna Taitte Irle go rabadair bun or eionn ar rpar ro tuairim rin.

An ffrainne

Sa Ufrainne, táimis an tuet arim go mior ré eionnear an air uatbairis oo tárla rsecatanna rparis an Cogaí mior. Bi an Maiuir rrioch as éirige aorta agus bioir ir go raib ré rrioch, oá mbead cogaí arir aon go mbead ré na Arto-Tairide ar na Com-Consantoiri, har rin réin, ni raib baint ar bir aige le ion-cuirar arim na ffrainne. Bi a rriar rrioo go rriomlín réin Maiuir rriecain. Bi oo tuairim aige sin na rreorair aon out ar aiair mior a deanam ar páire an catá go mriurir ar comact lámairuige an nairao nó ar a tuigeat go tuigeatúar go mior é. Cairreair a rrioo, amac, na raib rriua rriouirte oo ceair oo rieri a comairle rin ac oiruirte rrealaoda agus go breairair iao atair na oiair rin, oá mbead ronn ar an arim pan oo deanam—moo ná raib. Oo rieri na rriouirte rin, oo leagat rrior go rriuin nár ceair rrior oo baint ar tankanna ac aiam har consnam leir na gcoisite. Riom ionnsuir oois, bi an rrioonair leir an rriuge a o'ollamú oois agus pan ionnruide réin, bi an rrioonair rriom le hiao oo coraint. Ni raib ceo aon breirair rrioo oirim a deanam go mbead line an nairao rreabta.

An Searmain.

Marab ionann ir na Sapanais agus na ffrainneais be an tuar ba bun ir ba har le rriirteanna cogaí na nSearmaineac ó rrioch. Oo deimeatair amac go Scuirir tuar an tank ar neamh nio rrioo an noo-leiririoet cogaí acá rriarair go mion-minic oo tábaet atá le tuar maiuir le rriouirte oo cuir eun rriide. Deimeatair amac

Keep your copies of "An Cosantoir" in a safe place. You will want them for reference later

fheirim sup ceart méio áiríte comácta
iscúirai ionnruideacta beir as an tuet feadma
túio ríor. Tuigeasor fheirim muna mbead caoi
acu feíom oo baint ar an oíoonár so scaití
nuo éisim eile oo éur in meao. Agus cá fearr
an teact aniar aduaid eúise pin. Mar pin, oo
baineasor feíom ar an bfué-ppiaieact, ar
camouflege, ar eluain-bearta 7 ar elúois deatais
de ní pabasor pártá sup leor na feirteanna úo
so léir cun buadaint ar an tuet copanta. Oo
faotruigeasor pé pún oá gléar nuao foza.
O'foglunmigeasor an céao ceann acu ón arm
Ruao. De gléar é pin ná paisiúinú oo éur anuar
tré bitin papachute agus oínead na óiaio pin
bheir fórrai oo éur roirí ar pluas móir-eiteallán.
De an tarna ceann ná tumaó-pléargóirí agus
eiteallán as eitilt so hírealt oo éur as cabrú le
tánkanna agus uairseannra le foza-fórrai.
Agus bin mar oo éuao ná trí náiríum ircead
ra cozaó na Seapmánaig agus an blitzkriegs mar
foirgeat acu. Na píancais so díreívead
mall de iao so pábáita oarí leo péin. Bí na
Sapanaig pártá so bpeasorair beart cun a
leapa oo oéanam pé mar a tuitsead anuar.
Bí munín acu ar a scuio fórrai cois a ríor
beir acu so pabasor oitce i lámhréail úiríurí
cozaó. Arm beas oo bí acu áiméad agus mar
pin, ní seaporair pumna a oéanam a átaróeao an
cozaó mar peo no mar píuo.

MEET THE MANAGER

The title manager is not included in military
vocabulary, and it is probable that anything said
(or written) by that unenviable individual will
attract little attention from readers. My words
will therefore be few and brief.

The manager's job is mainly concerned with ad-
vertising and sales, and he has no sympathy for the
worried Editor until his own worries regarding the
total advertising spaces sold and the total circulation
desired have been liquidated.

Every reader can help in this liquidation process,
because every reader can induce a friend to become
a purchaser, whether it be of advertising space or
a copy of An Cosantóir.

In the adjoining column you will find a letter
about this matter addressed to each Unit Com-
mander and Commanding Officer of the Army and
the L.S.F.

The Manager respectfully commends to every
reader the last two paragraphs of that letter,

Keep your copies of "An Cosantóir" in a safe place. You will want them for reference later

A GOOD BEGINNING

The following communication has been ad-
dressed to each Unit Commander of the Army,
and to each Area Commander, L.S.F., in the
Southern Command.

Sir,—I am directed by the Officer Com-
manding the Southern Command to inform you
that it is intended to produce under the auspices
of Command Headquarters a twopenny, tech-
nical, military, weekly Review.

It will contain a large number of articles
written by competent Officers on matters of
current military importance.

It will also contain reports of activities
(sports, etc.) of Army Units and Sub-Units, and
similar reports of the activities and programmes
of L.S.F. Units.

No material will be published without the
approval of Southern Command Headquarters.

The need for up-to-date, authoritative in-
structional literature on defence problems is
urgent. In order to make it financially possible,
it is desirable that all Unit O.C.'s should assist
the circulation of the Review within their Units
and help to maintain the standard of the con-
tents by getting contributions and suggestions.

The co-operation of the L.S.F. is vital to
the success of the Review. Area Commanders
can help by getting the L.S.F. authorities to
take measures to circulate the Review, to get
contributors and suggestions and, a very im-
portant point, to encourage advertisers to ad-
vertise in the Review.

I have the honour to be, sir,
Command Training Depot,
Collins Barracks, Your obedient servant,
Cor. Dec. 5th, 1940. SEÁN BUSTEED, Capt.

A Talk to N.C.O.s

(The following are extracts from a lecture given
by Colonel M. J. Costello, O.C. Southern Com-
mand, to a class of potential N.C.O.s on the occa-
sion of their graduation.)

Importance of Good N.C.O.s.

We cannot get on without good N.C.O.s The
N.C.O. is the authority who is in closest touch with
the soldiers. He is in the best position to under-
stand how their minds are working and to influence
and control them by his advice and example. It is
his task to lead, train and discipline the men. Even
the best Officers cannot produce crack fighting units
unless they have good N.C.O.s I am sure that the
Army will have no complaint about its N.C.O.s
while we have men like you going back to the Units.
You have had to earn your stripe by plenty of hard
work and by showing zeal and devotion to duty.
You have now to prove yourselves worthy of it.
You must keep on learning. Especially you must
acquire all the practical experience you can. If
experience is to be of any benefit to you, you must
reflect, think over it, learn from it. A famous
general once remarked about this matter that he
had a mule which had been through 20 campaigns,
but it was still a mule. You are not mules, far
from it, but you cannot stand still. If you do not
constantly strive to advance in skill and knowledge,
you will slip back and even forget all you have
learned.

Great Responsibility of the N.C.O.

You are being given a great responsibility. In
time of peace only the judges of the court are given
power to take away life. They have days to con-
sider their decisions; and they have a lot of learned
men to help them to make a right decision. These
judges spend their lives preparing for their great
responsibilities. In time of war, questions of life
and death are in your hands. The State is placing
the lives of six or seven men in your hands. Upon
your leadership, your determination and your skil-
ful training of these men depends their survival in
battle. And your responsibility may be even
greater than this. The safety of the state, of the
whole people, is a bigger matter than the lives of
six or seven men, and this may depend upon the
valour, devotion to duty and skill of you and men
like you. Your superiors will show you where your
duty lies, but you must, yourselves, prepare now
and keep on preparing for the situations you may

have to face in battle. You must constantly realize
your great responsibilities. If you keep these in
mind you will neglect no chance of fitting yourself
for the supreme moment of action. It is up to you
to be worthy of your positions as leaders.

Leadership and Morale.

It is up to you to set a high standard of loyalty
discipline, devotion to duty and smartness. Men
learn more from example than they do from preach-
ing and you will not be much of a success unless
you practice what you preach. You have shown
on the course that you can do both.

One of the most important things in the army is
its spirit. They have two French names on this—
"Morale" and "Esprit de Corps," but even if you
have not heard these terms you know what they
mean, because you have seen this spirit in action
yourselves. When you have seen good teams fight-
ing stiff opposition at games, you have seen that
spirit, that fire burning in every man which enables
the members of the team to do things they would
not ordinarily do at all. Can you imagine one
member of the team "selling the pass" or "letting
down" his team. Each military unit is a team and
it will be a successful team only if each of the mem-
bers have the team spirit and if they have confidence
in their comrades, and, above all, in their leaders.

If you were being let down a very high cliff at
the end of a rope by six or seven men it would
be a matter of great importance to you whether the
men at the top were men to be depended upon and
whether the men in charge was dependable. Your
life would be in their hands. In every fight our
lives are in the hands of our comrades and especially
in the hands of the men in charge. You have got
to win the confidence of your men, to make them
confident of their unit, to develop in them the spirit
which will never let down the team.

You want to gain the confidence of your men.
There is only one way of doing that. It is to prove
yourself worthy of it. Be capable and efficient; be
reliable; look after the interests of your men, strive
constantly to make them and yourself more formid-
able fighters. Do this and they will go cheerfully to
battle with you.

If you are so foolish as to try to win your men to you by seeking popularity, by "scratching the men's backs," you may be liked, but you will not be respected. Men will not cheerfully risk their lives on your order. You would like an agreeable companion on a journey, but if you had to choose a man to drive you on a dangerous journey over a mountain pass you would not look for a comedian or even a nice, mild, agreeable, generous fellow, you would look above everything else for a good driver. A competent, careful and tough man is what you would like to have.

Constantly looking after the men's interests will help to bind them to you. From your experience as soldiers you will know best how to look after them, to help them, to suggest to your officers the things which might be done to make the men more efficient and contented and especially you will know the little things which you can go and do at once yourselves.

Discipline.

Discipline is to a great extent a state of mind also. It is a habit of mind. It is the habit of obeying at once, cheerfully and above all obeying intelligently the orders that are given. This has got to be as habitual in the army as the habit of walking like a soldier with your head up and your chest out. We can have no exceptions to this habit and when men have formed the habit it will stick to them, and there will be no difficulty in obeying any order that is given. Without this habit we would have no army, but a conglomeration of fellows each going his own way and having to be shepherded like a flock of sheep.

The first thing the N.C.O. has to do about discipline is to give good example himself. If you are an example of prompt, cheerful and intelligent obedience to orders, your men will be the same, but if you give bad example you can be sure they will copy you and flout your own authority.

Another thing which is of great importance though not as important as example is the way you drill your men. If your drill is sloppy, slovenly, slow and careless it is going to have a definitely bad effect on discipline. Five minutes of drill when everybody is on his toes and when the whole lot are moving like one body, having the same cohesion and unity in their movements (the way you have been drilling yourselves), will do a lot to develop the habit of prompt obedience. Men get an exhilaration in this kind of drill if it is not overdone and they will respond without a question to control.

The first thing you must do is give good example. The second is to have clockwork drill.

Pride of Unit. (Esprit de Corps).

In order that a man may be proud of his unit, you must make the unit something to be proud of. Try to make your unit better than other units in some way or other without falling below the required standard in any other respect. Some units may be better than others at shooting, some at scouting, some at marching, some may have the best kept vehicles, some the cleanest billets. Make your section excel all round but try to win first place at something. Nothing succeeds like success, and once you achieve success you will find it easy to keep it up.

No soldier will be proud to belong to an untidy, sloppy crowd. While officers have to get after this we depend upon you in the first instance to see that your men are clean, smart and well turned out. You will have to see that they walk at all times with the proud air that soldiers are entitled to wear. In this matter also the most effective control you have on them is your own example. If N.C.O.'s appear like something "the cat would drag in out of the wet" they have no right to check men for appearing like themselves.

A soldier has to spend a considerable lot of time waiting for something to happen in war, standing on guard, waiting for the advance, etc. This is always a great strain on a soldier's power and endurance. One of the signs of a successful leader is that he is able to keep his men interested and to fight against this spirit of being fed up, etc. In every walk of life we have our difficulties and from time to time you will become fed up and feel that everything that could be wrong is wrong. The soldiers feel fed up, of lying and moping about twice as much as you, you have certain privileges that they have not. You have to face that and realise that there is an enemy there that must be fought all the time. That enemy is *boredom*. You can fight that enemy by seizing those as opportunities to teach or practice some subject especially on a competitive basis, or, by giving the men some games to play, encourage them to laugh, when on the point of tears—get someone to sing a song. In this way by inspiring men with discipline, by trying to make them proud of belonging to their Unit, by keeping their minds occupied and interested you can succeed in developing a pride of Unit, a spirit that is essential to all groups of men and you can succeed in developing that cohesion that is absolutely essential to a military unit.

Orders.

All kinds of people get into trouble—Generals,

Colonels, etc., in the army because they do not understand orders they get. If an officer comes along and you have only a faint idea what his orders are, you may, in peace time only get yourself into a bit of trouble, but in time of war you may get yourself and your men wiped out. Make sure when you get an order exactly what you are to do. The man who gives out an order is responsible for making himself clear to you. You are therefore entitled to expect him to explain clearly whatever he wants you to do. Do not hesitate to ask a question and keep on asking questions until you are clear as to the exact intention of the person giving the order.

Just as I said you are entitled to a clear order from the man over you, the men under you are entitled to a clear order and from the very first you would want to practice giving clear and definite orders. If you go into a room don't say "come out here and do so and so," or "some of you go into that house." These kind of orders always cause trouble and if you are in command you should give your orders specifically. You should say: No 1 Section, go into that house, or you should name the man or look him straight in the face or point to him. If you do not do that it will be hard to condemn the man if he comes along and says: "I didn't think you meant me to do that," or some other excuse like that. In a field of battle that would be more serious.

Be definite and firm in giving orders.

Initiative.

I have said that your duty would be pointed out to you but you cannot always expect to get orders or the situation may have changed so that your orders are no longer applicable. You will therefore have to act on your own initiative, if you are to avoid one of the greatest crimes which a leader can commit—the crime of inaction. No man can be a good leader unless he is capable of showing initiative of acting when necessary without specific orders. It will be easy for you to do this intelligently if you seek every opportunity of fully understanding the intention or general purpose of your superior commander. You will then be able to act in accordance with his plan and the spirit of his intention, even if you have no exact order to guide you. Several of the most famous victories of the past have been won by subordinate leaders who saw an opportunity of striking a really good blow at the enemy or frustrating his intentions and who acted on their own responsibility in seizing these opportunities.

MORALE AND ESPRIT de CORPS.

Southern Command Headquarters,

Collins Barracks,

Cork. 20/12/1940.

TO EACH OFFICER IN THE COMMAND

Although a good deal of work is being done in the development of the fighting spirit and pride in the unit, I think that a good deal more could be done, especially by Platoon and Company Commanders. I am afraid that in some cases Platoon Commanders have not been made to accept full responsibility for turning their platoons into good fighting instruments. This applies especially to those matters which require attention in order to develop the moral qualities of the soldier.

The necessity for and the nature of discipline should be fully understood by all officers. Where necessary, Commanding Officers will lecture their subordinates on this matter. In this connection the notes on morale and discipline issued to the L.S.F. course here might be found useful.

More initiative and energy should be shown by our young officers in looking after their men. They should constantly study the minds of their men and constantly endeavour to influence them in the right direction. The best soldiers in the platoon should be encouraged and the worst should receive personal attention with a view to discovering what is wrong.

Many competitions could be run within the platoon, and inter-platoon and inter-company competitions could be developed still further. The best shot in each platoon, the best grenade thrower, the best turned-out soldier, the men with the best kit, the man with the best conduct sheet, should all be publicly noticed; the best scout, the best man at judging distance, etc., should have honour done to him and his merit publicly recognised.

Besides purely military competitions, inter-unit rivalry at games should be fostered and it would be useful to have "question time" competitions, provided the questions in every case are ones which a good soldier might be expected to be able to answer. Suitable types of question would be—to describe the road from one place to another; to describe some feature of ground through which the unit has passed; to describe some features of military vehicles, etc. Questions might also be asked about the war, about famous Irish soldiers of the past, about the historical associations of the locality in which the troops are stationed, and, generally, about any matter with a military or topographical flavour.

M. J. COSTELLO, Colonel.

Officer Commanding, Southern Command.

The New 5,000 Yard Grid

by COMMANDANT T. GRAY,
Headquarters Staff, Third Brigade

At the present time the Ordnance Survey Map in general use throughout the Army, e.g., the $\frac{1}{2}$ inch to 1 mile scale map, is being replaced by a new edition.

As regards its characteristics the new edition differs little from the old. The principal point of difference perhaps lies in the fact that the new map is "Gridded."

The application of the Grid System to our standard map involves a departure from the method hitherto employed in giving map references. With the object of enabling those who have had no previous experience in the use of Gridded maps to understand the method which must now be used, the following notes have been compiled.

To use the Grid system intelligently a knowledge of the principle upon which it is based is necessary. This principle is simple and can be easily grasped.




FIG 1.

Referring to Fig. 1, we see two lines A X A' and B X B' which are drawn at right angles and which intersect at the point X. The position of a point "P," assuming that the position of "X" is known, can be defined or described by the two lengths X Y and Y P, or in other words by the distance from the line A A' measured at right angles to that line, and its distance from the line B B' measured at right angles to that line. These two measurements, collectively, are known as the co-ordinates of the point "P." The lines A A' and B B' are referred to as the axes, and the point of intersection "X" as the origin.

Upon the basic principle just outlined the Grid system is founded. Reference to Fig. 2 will show its application.




FIG. 2.

In Fig. 2 the rectangle is assumed to represent the outline of a map. It will be seen that the left hand edge and the bottom edge of the map correspond respectively to the axes A A' and B B' in Fig. 1, and that the bottom left hand corner of the map corresponds to the origin "X." The position of a point "P" on the map can accordingly be described by stating its distance from the left hand and bottom edges respectively, the measurements being made in the manner previously described.

The process of measurement can be facilitated if a number of lines spaced at equal distances and parallel to the left hand and bottom edges are superimposed on the map. If the distance between the lines be taken as the unit of measurement the co-ordinates of a point can be stated in terms of "lines." Thus on Fig. 2 the point "P" is 3 lines from the left edge of the map, and 2 lines from the bottom, and its co-ordinates are accordingly (3-2).

Where greater precision is required a refinement can be introduced by making the measurements in terms of "lines" and "tenths of the distance between lines." Thus in the case of the point "Q" which is 4 lines and "3 tenths of the distance between lines" from the left edge, and "2 lines" and "8 tenths of the distance between lines" from the bottom, the co-ordinates would be 4.3 and 2.8, the decimal point being introduced to differentiate between "lines" and "tenths of lines."

The order in which the co-ordinates have been given in these two examples should be noted. The distance of a point from the A A' or vertical axis is always given first, its distance from the B B' or horizontal axis last.

Since the sides of a map are North and South lines, and the bottom edge an East and West line the distances are measured in an Easterly and Northerly direction respectively, and in that order

Thence it is customary to refer to the first distance as the "Easterly Co-ordinate" and the second distance as the "Northerly Co-ordinate."

This brings us now to a consideration of the Grid system employed on the new $\frac{1}{2}$ inch map. In the examples quoted we have been dealing with a single map sheet, and the Co-ordinates of the points chosen have been given in relation to the bottom left hand corner of the sheet. We have now to picture all the sheets which go to make up the map of the entire country placed in their relative positions. This composite map, if it can be so described, is now the Unit, and over the whole map is superimposed a network of lines—the lines as before being drawn parallel to the map edges, or in North-South and East-West direction. The lines (referred to as "Grid Lines") are spaced at a distance corresponding to 5,000 yards, each line being numbered at the point where it intersects the sheet edges.




FIG 3.

Fig. 3 represents a portion of the new Grid on the $\frac{1}{2}$ inch to 1 mile scale map. The manner in which the Grid lines are numbered should first be noted. In the first place it will be seen that the numbers progress by "fives." Secondly it will be observed that as the distance between Grid lines is 5,000 yards the numbers relating to any particular Grid line indicate its distance in thousands of yards from the left hand edge or the bottom edge, as the case may be of the most Westerly, or most Southerly sheets of the entire series. It should be noted also that in order to achieve uniformity in regard to the number of digits which a Grid line number may contain a nought has been prefixed to those Grid line numbers which would otherwise be comprised of two digits. Where the Grid line contains only

one digit two noughts are prefixed.

Next let us see how a map reference may be given using the new Grid. In Fig. 3 take the point "P." This point lies at the intersection of the two Grid lines 175 and 095. Its Co-ordinates in full will be 175.000 and 95.000 yards respectively. The map reference to the point will be written as "175-095."

Now take the point "Q." This point does not lie at the intersection of the Grid lines—it lies some distance to the right, or East of Grid line 175, and some distance above, or to the North of Grid line 095. Here, in order to arrive at the Co-ordinates of the point we must sub-divide the distance between the Grid lines into "fifths" (the distance being 5,000 yards), and we must add the number of "fifths" which the point is further to the East, and further to the North to the respective Grid line numbers. As the point "Q" is approximately four-fifths further to the East and three-fifths further North, that is to say 4,000 yards and 3,000 yards respectively its Co-ordinates, in full, will be 179.000 and 98.000 yards. The map reference to this point will be written as "179-098."

If we wish to be extremely accurate we can further sub-divide the distance between Grid lines by dividing the "fifths" into ten equal parts or "fiftieths." Again referring to the point "Q" we see that it lies exactly four-fifths and three-tenths of a "fifth" East of Grid line 175, and three-fifths and seven-tenths of a "fifth" North of Grid line 095, that is to say, 4,300 yards and 3,700 yards East and North respectively. Adding these distances to the numbers of the Grid lines we get the Co-ordinates of the point to be, in full, 179.300 yards and 98.700 yards. The map reference to the point would, in this case, be written as "1793-0987."

When giving a map reference it is not the practice to quote the Co-ordinates of a point in full. The full Co-ordinates of the point "P" (Fig. 3) as we have seen, are 175.000 yards and 95.000 yards. Were the final noughts to be omitted the position of the point could just as easily be determined. Hence a map reference in the case of the $\frac{1}{2}$ inch map will normally consist of a total of six figures, and where greater precision is required of eight.

With sufficient practice little difficulty should be experienced even by those unacquainted with the arbitrary systems hitherto employed, in using the new Grid system. One cardinal rule must always be remembered: Easterly Co-ordinates should be given first, Northerly Co-ordinates should be given last, and one pit-fall should be avoided—the tendency to treat "fifths" as decimals and to place them after the Grid line number rather than to add them to it.

AMBUSHES

By CAPTAIN LIAM DEASY,

Headquarters, Southern Command

THE ARMY with superior personnel and superior weapons is free to adopt offensive measures when and where its leaders find it good tactics. In the same way the opposing army of smaller numbers, and less armament, is compelled to remain on the defensive against superior forces. The exception to this rule is in the sending out of small parties to harass an enemy in front and adopt the method of "strike fast and get away." This method can be applied against much larger moving forces of the enemy who may be surprised by men in concealed positions. In general this form of warfare is known as "ambushing."

The small countries of Europe, including our own, have been compelled to adopt this form of warfare, because of the superior numbers which their enemies have been able to plant at key points, and which compelled the smaller armies to take shelter on the hillsides or lie low in their dugouts. These superior enemy numbers made it impossible to a smaller army to occupy a line against them in the open, but instead it showed the leaders of the small native armies the one way of meeting and beating superior forces. The method which proved successful has been that of an army trained in Guerilla Tactics, and having the support of the people, who have rallied behind it, as the eyes and ears of a perfect intelligence service. In short, guerilla tactics, or ambushing, as we know it here, is the usual course resorted to by native troops in the defence of their country against forces or invaders better equipped and with superior numbers.

An ambush by men well placed in a good position can be carried out successfully against a much superior body of the enemy. This is done by retaining to the ambushing or attacking party the element of surprise. Surprise is one of the most important elements in warfare. No such thing as good generalship, superior armament, superior personnel, is going to stand up against the element of surprise. It destroys the enemy, and if followed up by cool, well trained and well led men, no opposing force can escape destruction.

To carry out these tactics to a successful conclusion, certain rules must be followed. Although they vary according to conditions, yet, departure from them generally leads to defeat. The main prin-

ciples can be summed up under headings like these:

1. Groups must not engage in any losing battles. Unless indications of success are strong they should refuse the engagement.

2. Surprise is the main offensive in the well led group. Stationary warfare must be avoided. An ambush party has no reserves and rarely communications, except through the enemy lines. In a long engagement the enemy has every advantage, and generally the attackers chance of success diminishes in proportion to the duration of the battle.

3. An ambush must be unexpected and have an element of complete surprise. It must have the affect of creating a situation which will negative an enemy's superior numbers and equipment. This is done by the confusion which follows the opening shots, thereby enabling the attackers to liquidate a great portion of the enemy's strength before he gets a chance of using it.

A carefully detailed plan of attack, and especially of retreat, must be worked out before an ambush is attempted. This requires careful management, absolute attention to detail and deliberate preparation. While all three mean practically the same thing, yet, to carry out an ambush requires the capability of making a quick decision; to be able to change from one plan to another at a moment's notice, and be prepared to strike your most effective and powerful blow at the very start of the operation.

4. In an ordinary engagement superiority in numbers is necessary, but in an ambush a swift determined surprise attack can be made on a moving convoy by a much smaller number.

Many successful attacks have been made by columns of twenty to sixty men against enemy convoys of hundreds.

5. In action the ambushing line must be elastic. Once it becomes evident that the enemy are in greater force than expected your position should be such as to enable withdrawal with the same speed as you began to attack. Reliable Junior Officers must be developed in every Unit capable of replacing a Commander eliminated in battle. Responsibilities of Section Leaders must be greatly relied on in this type of warfare.

6. The tactics of decoy, distraction and diversion must be mastered. The principle of pretending to attack at one point while you actually attack another must be encouraged. Small groups are never to concentrate on one place, but change their positions frequently before an ambush.

Secrecy of movements is essential to success, as also are well worked out plans for dispersal after an attack. The party who can appear and disappear quickly completely demoralises an enemy.

Circumstances that enable a Commander to decide on an ambush are. First:

Information about the enemy's position.

What is his strength?

Where he is likely to operate, and what road or roads he is likely to use?

If he uses transport what is the maximum that your own forces are capable of undertaking?

Your own personnel and equipment must be considered under this heading.

Next: The position where the men will be placed. This should be close to the road to ensure a quick decision. The closer the range of weapons the more effective it will be on enemy morale.

After selecting the position, the Commander shall imagine himself in position of the enemy, in order to be satisfied that advantage of position was entirely in his favour. The position should have suitable retiring ground in case of surprise, or meeting with superior numbers. It must be impressed that a good position increases considerably the value of the arms held. No matter how well trained or enthusiastic the soldier is, he is going to give a better account of himself from a position in which he recognises the advantage he holds over the enemy, and vice-versa if the position is bad.

Cross fire should be avoided, and where close-up fire is provided for, the position should be on one side of the road. Enfilading fire is essential, and positions for men at either end of the ambush are necessary.

Where mechanised troops are expected, road blocks of a temporary type or trenches are necessary, but they should not be the type that would protect an enemy from fire. Mines are the most effective form of road block, if available. Dead ground should be avoided or loose barbed wire may be thrown there, so as to prevent the enemy from taking cover and using the position against the attackers.

An Observation Post or posts should be well established with a quick method of communication. On roads leading into position a sentry should be placed to give warning of and protection against the

enemy's approach from different directions. In the same way flanking parties should be so placed as to protect the column in ambush and prevent surprise.

The most effective weapons in a close-up position are shot-guns, revolvers, and grenades, with rifles covering off the party, and especially for their protection in case of a retreat.

A column should be organized into small groups or sections of not more than 10. In this way the Section or Squad leader can control a small body more effectively than he could a larger number. In a short and decisive engagement the Section leader must be placed so as to be in touch with all his men during the engagement. In addition to the Commander of the party there must be a second in command, who ultimately takes over control if the leader becomes a casualty. The leader must take his junior officers into his confidence. They must know the plan in detail and have such general instructions as will enable them to act on their own initiative during the fight.

Section leaders should be very clear beforehand on orders to fire, and on whose responsibility it is to open fire. Invariably the section at the furthest end will open fire. This gets the enemy locked into a position before he realizes it, and to avoid mistakes a Column Commander should make this order clear beforehand to the Section Leaders. They in turn should make their men fully conversant with this most important phase of the plan.

Very often there is a long waiting period, in which men cannot leave the position. Commanders of columns should see that their men are made as comfortable as possible, that they are provided with food, and except where it is absolutely essential, made to lie low. Some changes might be made which would enable men to move about, rather than be confined to one particular position for a long period of time. They should also ensure that men going into such positions should be well clothed.

If the best is to be got out of a column in action, food and protection from weather conditions are essential.

In modern warfare positions must be such as to afford concealment from Aircraft Observation. Once contact is established Section Commanders must ensure that fire is directed correctly. It is not enough to see that men are firing, but must also be satisfied that their fire is directed at targets. Waste of ammunition is most serious, but what is more serious still is the fact that except fire is properly directed the enemy will be able to extricate himself, and may eventually out-manoeuvre the attackers. Shot guns and grenades are most important in this type of close fire.

No time should be lost in taking the surrender at the end of a fight. Do not wait for the enemy reinforcements to come up. It is a column commander's duty to get his men to a predetermined point of safety.

The columns will leave the positions in sections with an advance guard and rear guard, after providing for the care and conveyance of any wounded men.

The commander will also see that his flanks and sentries are called in before he leaves the position. If it is necessary to move in small bodies out of position, this must be made known to all section leaders, so that the sections will finally assemble at the pre-

arranged spot.

The three main points to be observed in a successful ambush are: Good position, good plans, and the leader's example. Generalship is a deciding factor in an ambush. Men must get good position in case the enemy comes in superior numbers.

A column commander's place in an ambush is in front. There is no other way that makes for the success of the operation. Ambushing is of short duration, sharp and decisive.

Once men believe in the sincerity and fearlessness of their leader they will fight and follow him anywhere.

A Song for the Irish Militia

1782

The tribune's tongue and poet's pen
May sow the seed in prostrate men,
But 'tis the soldier's sword alone
Can reap the crop so bravely sown.
No more I'll sing nor idly pine,
But train my soul to lead a line—
A soldier's life's the life for me—
A soldier's death, so Ireland's free.

No foe would fear your thunder words,
If 'twere not for your lightning swords—
If tyrant's yield when millions pray,
'Tis lest they link in war array:
Nor peace itself is safe, but when
The sword is sheathed by fighting men—
A soldier's life's the life for me—
A soldier's death, so Ireland's free.

The rifle brown and sabre bright
Can freely speak and nobly write—
What prophets preached the truth so well
As Hofer, Brian, Bruce and Tell?
God guard the creed these heroes taught—
That blood-bought Freedom's cheaply bought
A soldier's life's the life for me—
A soldier's death, so Ireland's free.

Then welcome be the bivouac,
The hardy stand and fierce attack
Where pikes will tame their carbineers,
And rifles thin their bayoneteers,
And every field the island through
Will show "what Irishmen can do"
A soldier's life's the life for me—
A soldier's death, so Ireland's free.

Yet, 'tis not strength, and 'tis not steel
Alone can make the invader reel;
But wisdom, working day by day,
Till comes the time for passion's sway—
The patient dint, and powder shock,
Can blast an empire like a rock.
A soldier's life's the life for me,
A soldier's death, so Ireland's free.

The tribune's tongue and poet's pen
May sow the seed in slavish men;
But 'tis the soldier's sword alone
Can reap the harvest when 'tis grown.
No more I'll sing, no more I'll pine,
But train my soul to lead a line—
A soldier's life's the life for me—
A soldier's death, so Ireland's free.

A SUCCESSFUL RAID

By CAPTAIN M. DONEGAN

IN NOVEMBER, 1919, the armament of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Cork Brigade, could not boast of a single service rifle. A few .38 revolvers there were. Still a Rifle Battalion without a rifle seemed something of a misnomer. Before the month of November was out, however, ten rifles, as many revolvers, Verey pistols, plenty ammunition and various kinds of equipment were listed in the Quarter Master's Arament Columns.

It happened like this:—

One of our intelligence personnel reported that a small British war vessel, used for submarine chasing during the War (1914-'18) and still in Bantry Bay in 1919, which used normally to anchor well out from the pier, was now coming alongside and berthing at the pier whenever she visited our port.

On receipt of this information, an idea began to take shape in the minds of the Battalion Staff; an idea that it would be a great stunt to raid this vessel while berthed at the pier and so procure some much needed rifles.

Intelligence.

Our information was pretty good. We knew the approximate time at which the boat used to come alongside and hitch up to the pier. We knew that the Officers used usually go ashore while the boat was in port. We knew the hotel they used to frequent. We knew the nature of the "watch" on the vessel herself—one sailor armed with a revolver. We knew in which portion of the boat the rest of the sailors—about fifteen in all—used to be at night-time. We had a good idea where the arms themselves were stored. In a word we knew all about the little ship from the outside at any rate.

All this information was given us by one of our men who worked in another ship in the bay.

We decided to do the "job."

Plans.

We made a few plans and scrapped them. The job wouldn't be very simple because there was a military and police patrol in Bantry town itself

every night quite close to the pier and any bungling or alarm would mean that all on the pier could be immediately cut off and wiped out or captured.

At length we settled on a plan—four of us—Ralph Keyes, now Lt. Keyes, 31st Battalion; Michael O'Callaghan, now Judge Advocate General; Sean Cotter, now Lieutenant, 23rd Battalion, and myself were to go on to the pier, jump on board the vessel, overpower the watch, batten down the rest of the sailors, signal to the rest of our men—six in number—who were to be in cover in the Railway off the pier and who were to come immediately aboard to take the stuff.

Next we settled on a house in which to dump the booty and we settled on a way back from the pier to this house.

So arrangements were complete.

Our armament for the job consisted of two revolvers, held by the advance party and a sledge hammer (if this be armament) held by the men in reserve on the railway line.

It was not, however, a question of arms so much: we had no chance if it came to a show-down. It was a question of putting our plans neatly into practice without a shot being fired and our most important ally in achieving this would be and was surprise.

The appointed night arrived and at about 8.30 we moved towards the pier as already arranged—in ones and twos. We four of the advance party moved in twos as if for a stroll on to the pier. We could hear the sailors singing in the abaft cabin. It was a moonlight night so we could see the sailor on watch standing near the wheel-house amidship. He was our immediate objective and we had plans arranged to silence him.

Fortunately we had no occasion to put the plans into operation, because much to our amazement he moved abaft towards the cabin in which the other sailors were singing, and descended the ladder, disappearing in front of our eyes, and joining the others below. What prompted him to do this is very hard to say. He may have been going to relieve nature or maybe Providence took a hand in the game and urged him to move. Anyway, his head had hardly disappeared below the deck when two of us who had the revolvers jumped on board, ran to the abaft cabin, stuck our revolvers down and ordered all below to remain as they were. The surprise was complete.

I can feel the silence that followed our command even now. We told them that if they remained quiet nothing would happen to them, but that at the slightest movement a bomb would be dropped amongst them. We had of course no bomb to drop and even if we had the dropping of it it would mean our own undoing, as the Military Patrol would be on the scene immediately. 'Twas pure bluff, but the bluff worked and worked well. Nobody moved.

While this was happening the other two had jumped aboard the boat, had signalled to the men in reserve in the Railway and these now swarmed on deck.

Two men were placed on guard over the sailors in the cabin, and I went forward just in time to see the armoury door being smashed in by a blow from the sledge hammer. I shall never forget the thrill I got on seeing a number of rifles in a rack under the ray of the flash-lamp. How regular and uniform rifles look in the rack. That was how they struck me just then. And they were ours for the taking!

And take them we did. Eager hands grasped them—ten in all—others stuffed revolvers into their pockets, and all filled ammunition, equipment, etc., into bags which had been brought for the purpose. We cleaned out the little room in no time. I gave a final warning to the sailors to stay put for at least half-an-hour. (They didn't obey this order in full: after a quarter of an hour one put his head out the

port-hole and began to yell and shout for help) and we all cleared with our booty from the scene.

So far so good; but our job was not yet done. We partly guessed that the sailors would raise the alarm before the half-hour was up and it would not be a difficult job to intercept us getting back. We skirted the town and arrived at a house not one hundred and fifty yards from the Military Barracks. We then heard the bugles blowing the "Alarm," and soon lorries began to rush past the house on the road outside, while we disposed safely of our capture inside.

The town was surrounded. Widespread searches were made but no military mind thought of searching a place so near the Military Post. No trace was found and nobody was arrested.

The struggle for independence in that area now entered upon a new phase. The period of raiding of mails, raiding houses for arms, etc., had passed; with ten Ross-Canadian rifles and plenty ammunition bigger game was now hunted; the attacks on Barracks and ambush phase was about to begin.

One mistake we made, however; a three inch gun mounted on the bow deck we could, I think, have brought with us. The moral effect of having it would have cleared every police outpost in West Cork but the step from no rifle to a three inch gun was too great even to contemplate. I ndiaidh a cheile deintear na caisleain.

THE L.S.F.

(Continued from page 7)

- (iv) Removing or destroying certain stores and equipment useful to an enemy and liable to fall into his hands.
- (v) Providing a system of communication.
- (vi) Creating and defending a system of obstructed areas and covering positions.
- (vii) Fighting delaying actions in local areas.
- (viii) Protecting and garrisoning vital points not covered in (ii) above.
- (ix) Disposing of saboteurs, fifth columnists, reconnoitring detachments or other small bodies of the enemy.
- (x) Other Guerilla operations.

Each of these tastes will be the subjects of articles in subsequent issues of this paper.

Keep your copies of "An Cosantóir" in a safe place. You will want them for reference later

OUR INFORMATION BUREAU

Our Information Bureau will be available each week to all members of the Army and the L.S.F. who wish to be enlightened on matters dealing with their tasks, duties, training, etc. Questions should be clear and as short as possible. The name, rank, unit and address of the sender should be enclosed, not necessarily for publication. Every effort will be made to answer all questions. Any reader who desires a personal reply should enclose a stamped addressed envelope. All questions to be addressed to the Editor, An Cosantóir, Collins Barracks, Cork.

This paper is being published in an endeavour to supply with information and material for thought all those engaged in the work of organising and training for the defence of the nation.

Any suitable article or other contribution supplied will be much appreciated.

L.S.F. members are particularly requested to submit any new ideas they may have.

How to Instruct

THE final justification for the existence of an army is success in battle.

Such success in battle depends very largely on the previous good training of the troops. The better the training, the greater the likelihood of victory in action.

It is of vital importance then to the Army and the L.S.F. that their instructors should be very good indeed at their job.

Now what is it that a good instructor has to do in order to turn the recruits into well-trained soldiers? His job is not done until he has succeeded in making these recruits get the habit of using weapons properly and

of caring weapons properly and of carrying out various drill movements properly. When these new habits have become so fixed that the recruit will carry them out automatically even in circumstances of great disturbance or excitement, then and not till then can it be said that the recruit has become a well-trained soldier.

The cultivation of habits, of automatic behaviour of the right kind, in the soldier is the supreme task of the military instructor.

The first habit, and probably the most difficult habit, which you as instructor must instil into your pupils is the habit of paying attention to you. This habit of concentrating attention on a particular task is one that many of your pupils will probably not have had in the past.

It is very important that you should insist on this habit from the very beginning and that you should allow no departure even for a short time from the new habit until it is firmly embedded.

Now the habit of attention may spring from different origins. It may be based on the fear of punishment for inattention. Where necessary you will certainly use this method, but you will avoid it if possible.

It may be based on hope of reward in the shape, say, of praise or promotion or on a spirit of rivalry.

Best of all, it may be based on interest in the thing for its own sake.

An otherwise stupid man may astonish us with the extraordinary mass of detail which he remembers about football teams and matches, or about horses and horse-racing or about the family connections of his neighbours.

How is it that he has acquired this huge store-house of facts without any apparent effort? It is because he is intensely interested in the subject for its own sake. Interest is the great fountain-head of attention and consequently of knowledge.

An object not interesting in itself may become interesting through being associated with something in which interest already exists. That is the reason why comparison is drawn between kicking a football and aiming into the wind in the appropriate lesson in rifle marksmanship and why elevation is illustrated by throwing a stone to different distances. Your ingenuity as a teacher in applying this principle of association is of vital importance to your success.

In this connection remember that the most interesting thing to a man is himself and his own affairs. He finds, for instance, a railway time-table totally uninteresting until he becomes interested in a train journey and then the dull mass of figures commands his keen attention.

Your problem as an army instructor then is to associate each new item of instruction with the man himself or with something in which he is keenly interested or at least with something that he already knows.

To repeat, your ingenuity in applying this principle of association is of vital importance. The more you rouse the interest of the student, the more attention you will receive and the more successful your teaching will be. Every step in training cannot of course be made interesting in itself. It may be necessary to rouse the pride and pugnacity of the pupil to overcome his fear of boredom. It may even be desirable to take disciplinary measures. For instance to prevent men flinching at rifle-grenade firing (and thereby aiming wrongly) it may be desirable to warn them beforehand that they will be reported if they do not repeat the command "Fire" and then take a deliberate aim. The fear of the consequent C.B. will overwhelm the nervousness at the firing-point.

Such a method of commanding a pupil's attention, however, is the least desirable method and is dangerous where there is any element of the bully in the instructor's character.

Method of Training.

A lesson, or a whole scheme of lessons, can be divided into three phases:

- (1) Preparation by the instructor.
- (2) The actual teaching, and,
- (3) Reproduction and practice by pupils.

As an instructor you are responsible for the preparation of the lesson and provision of the kit or apparatus required for the lesson. *Previous Study:* Preparation of the subject then requires that you the instructor must have studied it until you have mastered it or at least until you know more than you have to teach. This study may, and should, extend throughout your whole career as a soldier.

In preparing for a particular lesson you take the facts that you have already acquired, examine them, consult your notebooks and text-books to refresh your memory, pick out the details that you consider essential and arrange them in what you consider to be the proper order.

You then examine each fact and decide how it can best be presented to your class. Be clear as to the exact aim or purpose of the lesson and keep this aim in mind all the time. Consider the pupils. How much do they know? How much can they learn in the time and circumstances? Can they be got to do some preparatory work before hand, such as reading manuals?

The subject matter of a lesson should not be written out in full. Notes that are written out in full are practically useless because usually all that you can do with them is to read them out in full to the class—which makes a very dead-and-alive lesson indeed. Your notes should consist of headings (and no more) for each stage of the lesson, so that by an occasional glance at them you are kept to the narrow path of the lesson and do not wander. Your notes should also contain reminders as to the methods of teaching at each stage. Do not be ashamed to have notes. The greatest lecturers in the world use notes. A good lecturer knows that he requires to have notes. In your notes make a special effort to avoid one widespread weakness amongst military and other instructors. Distinguish clearly between:—

- (1) details that are necessary
- (2) details that are not necessary, but nevertheless are interesting.
- (3) details that are quite accurate but unnecessary, and uninteresting and therefore useless, and
- (4) worse still details that consist of obscure, unintelligible high-sounding, technical phrases.

As to “(1) details that are necessary,” you should be quite clear in your mind whether or not the knowledge of this and that detail is definitely necessary to the soldier before he can become, say, a first-class rifle-grenadier if it is a rifle-grenade lesson or a first-class machine-gunner if it is a machine gun lesson or a first-class stalker if it is a stalking lesson.

For instance a soldier might easily become a first-class rifle-grenadier without knowing that the dischargeer is five-and-a-quarter inches long. He might use the weapon faultlessly in action, his care of the weapon might be perfect and he might have outstanding ability to make other soldiers as good rifle-grenadiers as himself. And at the end of the tale if he were asked how long is the dischargeer, all he might be able to answer would be “About six inches.”

The writer has seen instructors attaching great importance to such petty details as this five-and-a-quarter inches. The tragedy of this is that there is only a limited time for teaching the mass of really important military facts. Let us look at “(2) details that are not necessary but nevertheless are interesting.”

A soldier might become a magnificent machine-gunner without ever understanding, or even thinking about, the very ingenious device which makes the steam come out of the barrel-casing no matter what elevation the gun has. Some instructors do not realise that a knowledge of this detail, however essential to armourers, is not essential to machine-gunners. Nevertheless, after the essential details of instruction are given, in other words, *after* the soldier has become a machine-gunner, it may and probably will be very interesting for him to learn of the ingenuity of the steam-tube. Note that the time for discussing such matters is *after* the essentials have been completely dealt with. (The writer recently heard the steam-tube being fully described during a first-hour's instruction on the machine-gun). You, as an instructor, should be careful to give all the details that are necessary and *later* you should be able to provide details that will make interesting gossip, so to speak. Thirdly, there are details which are certainly accurate but are not necessary and cannot at any stage become interesting. We have had an example already in our grenade-dischargeer being five-and-a-quarter inches long. Machine-gunners sometimes have solemnly to learn that “the inside of the barrel-casing is tinned to prevent corrosion,” though none of them will ever see the inside of a barrel-casing and though it is only one of a hundred technical points involved in the manufacture of the machine-gun.

(Continued on page 30)

UMPIRING

PART I.—GENERAL.

Purpose of Umpires.

The chief purpose of umpires is to make tactical exercises of all kinds instructive. Instruction by umpires is given by creating situations which illustrate tactical doctrines or principles and by ensuring that all action is kept within the bounds of realism. The platoon or company commander who correctly executes a small problem with his unit is an umpire in the truest sense of the word. Instruction is his dominant motive. The preparation of any problem in which troops are to participate should contemplate and encourage the attitude that each commander, regardless of the number of umpires detailed, is in the final analysis an umpire.

Duties of Umpires.

The instructive value of a tactical exercise depends largely on the extent to which its conditions approach those of an up-to-date war. The main difficulty in such an exercise is to produce the realism of war. In the absence of bullets, shells and death, it is the chief duty of umpires to endeavour to create a war atmosphere and to ensure that actions develop in a realistic manner.

It has been said that a good umpire should combine the functions of an actor, a sports commentator, a war correspondent and a thought reader.

The job of an umpire is: (i) to create the atmosphere of war by describing sights, sounds and smells which are present in battle but lacking in an exercise; (ii) to influence the action of the local commander by describing the effects of enemy fire in action; (iv) to impart information to troops which the troops can gain in no other way but which would be available to them in war; (v) to keep the next senior, adjacent, umpire and umpires with hostile forces informed of the results of engagements and the intentions of commanders, in order that the exercise may be controlled in a realistic and warlike manner; (vi) to render umpire's reports.

“Picture Painting.”

In describing the sights and sounds of the battle field, umpires must be careful not to give commanders information which they would not get in war. Successful “picture-painting” to junior commanders of front line units should result in information being passed back to higher formations as in war. The picture of what is happening in front of forward units should never be painted for a commander who is to the rear, except on exercises without troops, in which case the commander would have no other way of getting the information.

Before an umpire can paint verbal pictures of fine effect he must be acquainted with dispositions and fine plans of the opposing force. By using imagination, and by continuously looking ahead, an umpire will be able to make use of lulls in the fighting to discuss probable situations in advance with umpire on his flanks and on the “enemy” side.

When painting verbal pictures of fine effect, an umpire should describe, not the number or exact locations of enemy weapons which are firing, but the type of noise they are making, the general direction or area from which the fire is coming and the casualties they are causing. It is then up to the commander concerned to take what action he thinks fit. If the action taken, or lack of it, seems to the umpire be wrong, he can paint the picture more graphically, but he must never dictate to the commander what he should do.

Control of the Action.

An umpire should inflict penalties by imposing delay or assessing casualties upon units which fail to adopt formation appropriate to the situation, to make proper use of cover and concealment, or to utilise fully the powers and capabilities of their weapons.

When casualties are assessed they should be assembled, tagged and sent to aid stations. After a specified time these men, assessed as casualties, should be made available in the form of replacements. In this way these men can still take part in the exercises. A similar procedure should be followed in the case of any prisoners captured by the opposing sides.

Deciding the Result of Actions.

Umpire decisions on the results of actions must be rendered promptly. Umpires will seldom possess all evidence bearing upon the questions which they must decide, but they should make every effort to

secure all information that it is possible to obtain without unduly delaying the progress of the exercise. To this end umpires must be thoroughly familiar with all orders issued and with communications that are sent or received. He is then in a position to influence the action in accordance with the line of action adopted by the troops and his knowledge of the actions of the enemy confronting them. Suppose, for example, that a platoon commander orders a frontal advance in a schematic or parade ground formation against enemy resistance, neglecting all opportunity which the ground affords for cover and manoeuvre. The umpire should neither promptly rule that it cannot be done nor should he let the movement take place and then call the platoon back. He should go to the leading sections and stop them as soon as they have exposed themselves to fire from the enemy position, telling the section leaders that they are unable to advance in full of fire from such and such a direction or area. The platoon commander should then learn, through the normal channels, that his sections cannot advance and why, and his mind should at once turn to other ways and means of taking his objective.

Carelessness.

An umpire can never be too severe about careless acts or mistakes, which would have caused unnecessary casualties in war. This applies particularly to careless exposure to fire and air attacks. Bad examples of the former are frequently given by commanders of all grades; the latter concerns not only troops in action, but also troops in reserve and administrative services. Habits acquired in exercises will be repeated in battle; it is the umpire's responsibility to see that false lessons are not learnt.

Energy.

No umpire can ever do his job if he waits to be given information. He must get around, ask for the information he wants, and insist on getting it. He must anticipate points of contact and must be able to appreciate when he should be back at unit or sub unit headquarters to obtain the essentials of a new plan. He must remain in close touch with the umpires of the opposing side to put them into the picture and to learn what is happening on "the other side of the hill."

Secrecy.

Umpires should take the greatest care to avoid giving away the plans or dispositions of one side by injudicious actions or movements. This precau-

tion is particularly important at night, when the lights of umpires' cars may entirely destroy surprise.

Administrative Services.

An umpire must always bear in mind the administrative aspect of the battle. In exercises ammunition supply is often overlooked and the effect of enemy action upon the rearward services is rarely taken into account. In war administrative difficulties may cripple action. This lesson can only be brought home in exercise by good umpiring.

Umpire Reports.

Umpire reports, whether verbal or written, should contain only such observations and suggestions as are of constructive, instructional value. Long winded narrative only serve to confuse the lessons.

Training and Organization of Umpire Staff.

The umpire's job demands energy, foresight, imagination, a sound military judgement, tact and common sense. A good umpire must therefore be a good soldier.

Knowledge of the larger aspects of training should not erase its elementary aspects from the umpires mind. An exercise wherein the elementary combat duties of individuals and small units are shelved or neglected often does more harm than good.

Where practicable umpires should be thoroughly familiar with every tactical exercise before play starts. This should be accomplished by explanation, study, ground reconnaissance and by the advance play of the exercise as a map problem or map manoeuvre. In this way the umpire is made familiar with the situation and the different lines of action that may be adopted. His interest is stimulated. Later during the exercise, the forethought which he has given to his part in it will assist him in the making of quick and sound decisions.

The size and organisation of the umpire staff will depend on the nature of the exercise and the size and type of the forces employed.

A chief umpire may be appointed, who will direct the entire umpire system. He may frequently be the officer responsible for carrying out the exercise or the commander of the troop. Senior umpires may be appointed, one in charge of the umpires with each side. In some exercises senior umpires may be given certain assistants, such work as keeping situations, maps, computing time and space, etc.

Such an organisation facilitates the collection of information and the general control of an exercise in accordance with the decisions, orders and actions of the commanders and the troops.

Efficient umpiring depends to a large extent on a liberal provision of transport and inter-communication. To facilitate inter-communication throughout the umpire organization, umpire meeting places should be established as required. Umpires should visit these centres whenever possible to keep themselves in touch with the general situation.

- Umpire information is circulated:—
- (i) By personal touch between umpires.
 - (ii) By orderlies (on bicycle or motor cycle).
 - (iii) By an umpire signal service, where such is practicable.

The nature of the umpire organization will depend on the type of exercise and the men and means available. The one outlined above is suited to the requirements of larger forces engaged in combined exercises. The centralization of control which it aims at, would not be necessary, say, in L.S.F. exercises similar to those recently engaged in. In the latter case the exercise takes the form of small local actions, which are to some extent independent of each other. Consequently their is not the same necessity for centralization of control in the umpiring organization.

The test of any umpiring system is: does it make the best use of the umpiring means available to make tactical exercises instructive.

[The second article in this series will deal with particular forms of umpiring, such as, umpiring in attack, delay, etc., and with units of corps and services, e.g., artillery.

The material in this article is largely based upon official manuals. These in turn are partly based on matter in British manuals. The Minister for Defence has acknowledged his indebtedness to the British Stationery Office for the permission given to use such material.

CROSSBARRY
IMPORTANT HISTORICAL ARTICLE

In our next issue we will publish the first part of a tactical study of Crossbarry and the strategic position at the time of the action.

We have fortunately secured a first-hand account of this battle, written as an objective military study.

This account of a memorable engagement has many lessons for our soldiers of to-day.

It should be read by all. It is worth repeated study by leaders of all grades in the Army and the L.S.F.

THE L.S.F. RIFLE
(Continued from page 10)

flannel patch with grease or the oil issued for this purpose by the Ordnance Department, and swab the bore and chamber thoroughly with the patch, making certain that the bore and all metal parts of the rifle are covered with a thin coating of grease or oil.

Metal Fouling.

If small smears, flakes, or lumps which look like dull lead are seen on the surface of the bore near the muzzle or for about 6 inches down from the muzzle, they are metal fouling and must be removed. Metal fouling will be removed only by an instructor, noncommissioned officer, or mechanic. Selected noncommissioned officers and mechanics will be instructed in the method of removing metal fouling.

Rules for the Care of the Rifle on the Range.

Wipe out the bore with a clean cloth patch each time before going to the firing point.

Always clean at the end of each day's shooting. A rifle that has been fired should never be left overnight without cleaning.

Never fire a rifle with any dust, dirt, mud, or snow in the bore.

Never leave a patch, oily rag, cork, or other obstruction in the bore or anything sticking in the muzzle.

During range firing a noncommissioned officer will be placed in charge of the cleaning of rifles at the cleaning racks.

(To be Continued)

To the Publishers, "An Cosantóir,"
Paramount Printing House, Cork.

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IRISH SOLDIERS ABROAD

THE STORY OF IRELAND'S EXILE SOLDIERS.

It is one of the paradoxes of our history that, while our country has produced some of the finest leaders and bravest soldiers in the world, their achievements have brought benefits to foreign countries rather than our own. The explanation of this lies in the centuries of oppression and dissension which strangled our economic and political development up to 1916, and negated all our efforts towards emancipation by force of arms.

And thus it is not surprising that our soldiers for 300 years won their spurs chiefly on "far, foreign fields."

The foreign military achievements of our race began, however, on our own account. We conquered and colonized Scotland, frequently invaded

By Colonel M. J. Costello,
O.C., Southern Command

England during and after the Roman occupation of that country, and an Irish King died while leading his army at the foot of the Alps.

Soon the Norsemen gave us enough fighting at home. When these had been overthrown at Clontarf, only a century and a half elapsed until the invasion from England began. From the time of Elizabeth's plantation of Munster Irishmen again fought abroad but in the armies of foreign powers.

Enormous numbers of them went abroad to fight. After the Cromwellian Settlement the agents of the King of Spain, the King of Poland and the Prince of Conde competed for the service of Irish troops. In May, 1652, 7,000 went to Spain, and they were followed in September of the same year by 3,000 more. Lord Muskerry took 5,000 to serve the King of Poland. In three years 34,000 left their native land, according to Prendergast, the historian of the period.

After the Williamite wars even greater evodus took place. Then the penal laws, the confiscations and proscriptions at home at home kept up the

stream of exiles. During the 19th century famine and eviction sent hundreds of thousands to America, who largely fought the wars of the new republic.

The Irish have always been a military people. War has been the ruling passions of our race. Everywhere they went Irish soldiers earned a reputation second to none. Dean Swift said "he could not esteem too highly those gentlemen of Ireland who with all the disadvantages of being exiles and strangers have been able to distinguish themselves in so many parts of Europe by their valour and conduct above that of all other nations." Even bitter enemies of our race, like Sir John Norris and Spencer, the poet, give unstinted praises to the soldierly qualities of the Irish. William of Orange who was in a good position to judge said they were born soldiers.

The story of Ireland's exiled soldiers is a long one. It would lead one through the history of almost every civilized country, and it would cover centuries of time. In the following paragraphs it will only be possible to mention representative facts and names so as to convey a general impression rather than a detailed account of the military achievements of our people.

Irish Soldiers of France.

For centuries France was our friend and it was naturally to her the Irish soldier of fortune offered his sword. The Irish were well received there. They were befriended by the court and were welcomed by the army. A French military historian estimates that as many as 750,000 Irishmen died in the service of France between 1650 and 1800. McGeoghegan, the historian, who was chaplain of the Irish Brigade, says that 450,000 served in the years from 1691 to 1745.

The first Irish Brigade in the service of France was composed of Irish units taken from Ireland in exchange for French units sent to this country to fight for James the Second. Well disciplined, well trained and well led these units won renown on many a battlefield.

At Cremona, in Italy, 600 of them made such a determined and skilful resistance to a besieging Austrian Army that in spite of surprise and greatly superior numbers, the Austrians, under the Great Prince Eugene, were defeated in their attempt to capture the place. Prince Eugene said their defence was a miracle and Europe rang with their fame. They lost 350 men on this day. Their Commander, Major O'Mahony, was personally received and warmly thanked by the King of France, and the pay of the men was raised in recognition of their

services. At Fontenoy, the Irish Brigade, as part of the French reserves, made a famous charge which was the decisive factor in a decisive battle. It won the admiration of friend and foe; and was the inspiration of Thomas Davis' spirited poem.

Towards the end of the 18th century the number of recruits from Ireland began to fall off, and the history of this Irish Brigade end at the time of the French Revolution. Louis XVIII conveyed the gratitude of France for their services when he presented a standard with these words: "Gentlemen, we acknowledge the inappreciable services that France has received from the Irish Brigade in the last 100 years; services that we shall never forget, though under an impossibility of requiting them. Received this standard, as a pledge of our remembrance, a monument of our admiration, and of our respect; and, in future generous Irishmen, this shall be the motto of your spotless flag:—

1692—1792.

ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE FAITHFUL.

Thomas Davis was well justified in saying that "when valour becomes a reproach, when patriotism is thought a prejudice and when a soldier's sword is a sign of shame the Irish Brigade will be despised or forgotten."

Napoleon formed an Irish Legion and this was the only one of his numerous foreign Corps which was entrusted with an Imperial Eagle. After the Napoleonic Wars a free America attracted our emigrants. Only the descendants of the Wild Geese continued to fight for France, and the descendants of Corps which were decimated time and time again are naturally not numerous.

The Irish in France produced many fine leaders. General Kilmaine was born in Dublin. He was a friend and confidant of Napoleon whom he succeeded in the command of the army organised for the invasion of England. He died young, but his services in the Revolutionary wars mark him as one of the most brilliant soldiers of his time. General James O'Moran, born in the parish of Ross, Elphin Diocese, fought in American and in the Revolutionary Wars. He was executed like many others during the reign of terror, but the gratitude and esteem of the French nation is expressed in the inscription of his name on the Arc de Triomphe in company with the greatest soldiers of France.

General Lally, whose family came from Tullaghanadaly, Tuam, was another worthy representative of our race. The Great Marshal Saxe observed during a critical period of French history: "We can sleep peacefully for Lally is with the army." He made a great effort to retain French influence and power in India. Even his English enemies

acknowledge his merits. Descendants of the Wild Geese include General Louis Cavaignac, a French Minister for War, and Marshal Patrick MacMahon, a President of the French Republic.

Irish Soldiers of Spain.

When the Spanish Infantry was the finest in the world Spain sought eagerly for Irish soldiers. From 1600 to the beginning of the last century there were Irish units in the Spanish Army. During the early part of the 18th century there were hundreds of Irish officers as well as five Irish Regiments, those of Waterford, Limerick, Hibernia, Ultonia and Irelanda called "The Famous." The last three survived to fight Napoleon. These Regiments were officered only by Irishmen.

Sir Charles Oman, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, writes: "An astounding proportion of the officers who rose to some note during the war bore Irish names, and were hereditary soldiers of fortune who justified their existence by the unwavering courage which they always showed . . . Their constant readiness to fight, which no series of defeats could tame, contrasts very well with the spiritless behaviour of many of the Spanish Generals. No officer of Irish blood was ever found among the cowards and hardly one among the traitors. The whole Spanish Army was full of officers of Irish name and blood, the sons and grandsons of original emigrants." To name but a few they were: Blake, two O'Donnells, Lacy, Sarsfield, O'Neill, O'Daly, Maloney and O'Donoghue. Blake was in real merit the outstanding soldier of the Spanish Army in the Peninsular War. A great organiser, he was skilful, brave and determined and stands in marked contrast to the average Spanish commander of the period. An O'Donnell became Duke of Tetuan and Field Marshal of Spain. Ambrose Higgins, of Co. Meath, was the foremost Spanish soldier in Chili and Peru. James McKenna was Spain's greatest military engineer. A son of Ambrose O'Higgins was foremost among those who fought for and gained Chilean independence, and one of his chief Lieutenants was Colonel Charles Patrick Madden from Maryland, U.S.A.

The pre-eminence of the Irish soldiers in Spain was as marked as that of the exiles in France. One instance of their great services was the defence of Gerona in 1808. 350 men of the Irish Regiment of Ultonia and 2,000 Spanish civilians held the town against the most determined assaults of 6,000 French. Contemporary writers give the highest possible praise to the gallant Colonel Henry Donevan who commanded the Irish troops.

(To be Continued)

INTER-UNIT MOTOR CYCLE TRIAL

by LIEUT. C. A. W. MANDERS,

On the afternoon of Wednesday, 11th December, a new page of Army history was written when sixty seven riders, drawn from various Units, assembled at Victoria Cross, Cork, to take part in the first Army Motor Cycle trial ever held—the Southern Command Inter-Unit Trial.

No trial held in Ireland ever attracted so many entries, but any qualms that the organisers felt regarding the difficulties of planning for such a large number were soon dispelled by the individual assistance rendered by members of the Munster Motor Cycle Club—most of whom are keen L.S.F. members.

The course was designed to give a fair amount of road work at the start, and a secret check was included to test the ability of each rider to keep his machine to a set speed—in this instance 20 m.p.h. With the secret check disposed of competitors were led on to the observed sections where the fun started in earnest. For the benefit of the uninitiated an "Observed Section" is a piece of ground specially selected and flagged out because of its motor cycle "stopping propensities" and riders are required to navigate their machines safely through with penalties, in loss of marks, for such apparently simple faults as putting a foot on the ground to steady the machine. It would be tedious to describe the rest of the course in detail except to say that it largely consisted of mud, and then more mud, and it afforded ample opportunities for the expert observers for estimating the skill and capabilities of the riders and a fair amount of amusement, at times, to the spectators.

The skill displayed was of a high order throughout and the lessons learnt were of great value to army riders so that it is hoped to hold similar events in the future, and there is even a whisper of an L.S.F. versus Army event—so start tuning up that old machine.

Results:—

TEAMS.

- 1. Motor Squadron No. 1 Team 1047 marks
(3rd Field Signals, No. 3 Team)
- 2. Motor Squadron, No. 5 Team 1038 "

- 3. Motor Squadron, No. 7 Team 1034 "
- 4. 9th Battn., No. 2 Team 997 "
- 5. 9th Battn., No. 1 Team 981 "

INDIVIDUAL PLACINGS

- 1. Lieut Kirby (Motor Squadron No. 7 Team) 379 "
- Lieut. Prendergast (Motor Squadron No. 1 Team) 373 "
- 2. Vol. Dwyer (Motor Squadron, No. 5 Team) 373 "
- 3. Pte. T. Byrne (3rd Field Signals, No. 2 Team) 368 "
- 4. Sergt. O'Riordan (Motor Squadron, No. 2 Team) 365 "
- 5. Pte. A. Flanagan (3rd Field Signals, No. 3 Team) 359 "

Possible Marks, 420. No. of Starters, 67. No. of Finishers, 51.

HOW TO INSTRUCT.

(Continued from page 24)

In all fairness it has to be allowed that there will be room for difference of opinion among instructors as to whether certain incidents are or are not uninteresting. The important point here is that you as an instructor should have a clear and positive opinion as to whether some incidental which occurs to your mind is worth mentioning or not. Fourthly, we have the terms (so beloved of some instructors) which the instructor himself does not understand, which he of course cannot explain to the class and which terms in any case are not required for the lesson. The writer recently heard each of a half-dozen instructors compelling their classes to memorise the fact that "the external surface of the grenade discharger is engine-rounded." Not one of them understood the meaning of this obscure technical term "engine-rounded." They felt that it sounded learned and would impress their listeners. A weakness for such useless, unintelligible terms is a mark of the bad instructor. The soldier has quite enough to do mastering the details of his craft without having also to carry the burden of a lot of useless details.

In the above case a good instructor would have said: "The outside (not 'the external surface') of the discharger is rough to enable a good grip to be taken."

(To be Continued)

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